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El Jadida. It is the hour that milk is delivered. The hour that I love the most in my 
city, peopled still only for an instance by those who have to rise early: street cleaners, 
fisherman, donut vendors, the devout, vegetable sellers, the custodians of the public 
ovens. One after another they wish me a ‘luminous day’ while I wander the streets 
and alleys. Come with me into the old Portuguese town where the past has been 
restored in the smallest detail. In this space, the size of a public square, where, 
flanking each other, is a mosque, a church and a synagogue. What is this Islamism? 




All of history is testimony to the present. 
Antonio Gramsci 
 
Christianity invented the distinction between religious and secular, and thus it made 
religion. It made religion the problem – rather than itself. 
Gil Anidjar 
 
Power always seeks a language of legitimation. This language is neither invented ex 
novo nor simply borrowed. It is assembled, elaborated and practiced wherever 
possible and via whatever means. The making of such a language, that is the 
articulation of power to name, hence direct and define, necessarily draws upon 
available sense. In order to convince and convey, even when there is the desire to 
promote a radical announcement, language cannot stray too far from an already 
established semantics. It can only shift, extend and push the existing langue; that is 
why language is essentially about hegemony. The struggle for sense – both for 
meaning and direction – requires language. And if language is not invented but rather 
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constructed and configured, then existing semantics – social, cultural, political, 
historical, religious, and so on – coalesce and combine in its making. Or rather, they 
take form and flight there, in the very stuff and texture of the parole. It is also here, in 
its performative exercise and consensual recognition, that power is transformed from 
mere force to a disseminating pedagogy and the potential counter-site of possible 
replies. Here language itself can split apart. As Saba Mahmood has argued, there 
always exists the possibility of the undoing of a Saussurian linguistics and the 
presumed arbitrary nature of the sign, itself dependent on the strict epistemological 
distinction of subject and object and the rationalized conception of the former.1 For 
language is not simply the tool of the sovereign subject; it is also a reality that permits 
subjects to appear and act in the world. Language not only binds us to the world, but 
also folds us into a sense of place and belonging. Its rhythm and cadences speak of us 
and through us, and therefore its significance can never be fully arbitrary nor solely 
susceptible to conscious allocation. 
 
Religion, secularism and power 
Among the lexicons that have seemingly returned to invest the powers of the 
contemporary world is that of religion. Once assumed to have been superseded by 
modern, secular society, we discover that religion has become the name of a struggle 
for authority within modernity. We find this is as true in in Washington as in Cairo, 
and in cultural configurations correlated by Christianity as well as in those proposed 
by Islam, Judaism and Hinduism. Religion, as a modality of modern power, directly 
and indirectly seeks to provide the narrative authority able to domesticate the world 
and command the horizon of contemporary sense. More than a question of faith, it is a 
bio-political category and practice whose rites and rights suggest more than the 
institutional force of consecrated texts, theological debate and their custody in 
religious authorities; even more than the creation of communities of believers and the 
attraction of the sacred. At this point there emerges, as Foucault would have 
suggested, a discursive power that penetrates the textures of our lives and fuels the 
regulatory accounting of life, death and the universe. 
The seeming return and revival of religion in the contemporary world takes up 
residence in a modernity that since Max Weber has presumed secularism to be the 
                                                
1 Mahmood, “Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide”. 
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measure of its progress.2 This has subsequently been extended through considerations 
of the public sphere as a distinct Occidental phenomena developed in a series of 
debates developed around Jurgen Habermas’s noted contribution to the question. Still, 
if we pay attention to the practices of everyday life we are forced to acknowledge that 
is ultimately impossible to sustain any sharp distinction between the religious and 
secular spheres. In place of clear oppositions, or the chronological registration of 
religious belief being overcome and replaced by the disenchanted rationality of 
modern life, we discover that each is in fact deeply imbricated in each others’ path. 
Further, the argument made for secular advancement as a measure of being modern, 
ultimately betrays not only an unwillingness to engage with the historical and 
sociological evidence on the ground, but also presumes the Occidental privilege to 
establish periodization. Such considerations invite us to reconsider the ‘universal’ 
claims made on the behalf of Western secularism in the name of the presumed critical 
neutrality of disinterested thought. Once again, it is to acknowledge the location of 
such thinking in a precise historical and cultural formation whose certitudes are 
exposed in a planetary frame that consistently exceeds its claims. It is to query claims 
of objectivity and insist on a historical realism where empirical evidence is collated in 
the search for critical honesty.3 
I would suggest that this perspective might lead to two critical considerations. 
Firstly, that the modern, that is Occidental, invention of the category of religion, like 
that of race and ethnicity, clearly form part of the apparatuses of power that have been 
carried over from the colonial world into the postcolonial present. Here to claim the 
secular as part of a particular cultural formation and precise set of historical processes 
associated with the West (which clearly does not cover all the variants of modernity) 
is perhaps less to ‘abolish’ religion and rather to register the changed ground and 
conditions in which it occurs. For if Europe invented ‘religion’ as a constitutive 
category against which to measure the ‘progress’ of its modernity (apparently 
dividing the State from religious affairs, public affairs from private faith), it 
simultaneously reinforced the production of Judaism and Islam as subordinate 
versions of alterity. Secondly, arguments about the centrality of a scientific rationality 
                                                
2 As Bryan S. Turner points out, Weber’s arguments on religion and the secularism of an ascetic 
rational work ethic were actually more complex than usually assumed, and did not fit into a coherent 
whole. Turner, “Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses”. 
3 For an excellent discussion of these terms, see Gregor McLennan, Marxism & the Methodologies of 
History. 
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that sustains the secular outlook often seem to hold too far at bay questions of 
ruptures and paradigm shifts. I personally do not consider that secular modernity, 
secured in the scientific method and associated instrumental rationality, to be merely 
an Occidental ‘miracle’ as Ernst Gellner once put it.4 As opposed to ‘blocks’ of time, 
I think it perhaps more significant to think in terms of diverse configurations that 
permit certain analytical languages and their truth claims to appear. This leads to an 
argument about the historical and cultural valency of faith in the ‘scientific analytical 
method’, as well as its limits as a language and set of practices that are also mutable 
and historically contingent (not relative, but mutable so as to produce shifting 
temporal constellations of sense and analytical knowledge). In the end, the question of 
method is also about taking nothing for sacred, including the analytical method. It is 
to insist on the historical framing of cognitive science. So, to exercise secular thought 
has necessarily to acknowledge the worldly, let us say historical, limits that authorizes 
its voice, its power and the impossibility of pretending methodological neutrality. 
At the same time, we cannot readily presume secularism to be a hegemonic 
modality of thought or power. It is actually rather difficult to identify any Western 
society that is fully secular. The United States represents only a fairly extreme 
instance of the persistent presence of religion in the public and private life of 
Occidental culture, not to speak of the debates over divorce, abortion, gay rights, 
assisted suicide, the family and appeals to sentiments saturated in religious dogma. 
While operating in a diverse fashion, it would frankly be difficult to sustain that a 
strong sense of religiosity – in costume, custom and civil rites – does not exist in 
Italy, where I live (and that is leaving aside the persistent presence of the Vatican in 
the cultural and political life of the country). In a diverse manner, going to an English 
school that began the day with prayers and hymns, it would be hypocritical to deny 
my Christian upbringing whatever my personal beliefs. So, perhaps the point about 
the secular is to understand it in terms of a critical practice that recognizes its cultural 
provenance and historical limits. Occidental secularism, in other words, is deeply 
entwined in historical formations in which religion has by no means been laid to rest 
or overcome. Secularism as a concept and practice is itself the product of such 
dualisms as church and state, the City of God and the City of Man, and of the struggle 
for power between them. It is this formation that distinguish Christianity and the West 
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from all other societies and religions. As Joan Scott has pointed out, the historical 
study of secularization is ‘not the study of a universal process, but of a process 
distinctively embedded in the history of western Christian societies.’5 The political 
debate at this point is then less about the seeming triumph of Occidental secularism 
and rather about critically appropriating its aspirations in a world that cannot easily be 
bent to its will. The break through to the secular, to full rationality, is never fully 
achieved. This has significant consequences in the cultural tissues and political 
textures of everyday life. Reason, even with the sharpest edge, is unable to simply cut 
the slippery and amorphous body of the social world, reduce it to a transparent logic. 
With this we can begin to understand that the critique of secularism – its premises 
and pretenses – is not necessarily pursued in order to defend a religious order of 
knowledge. It emerges rather from a critique of the European Enlightenment, Kantian 
anthropology, Hegelian historicism and the reach of a particular rationalizing order 
that claims to render the world transparent to its reason. It is in that knot that 
rationality, Christianity, colonialism and Occidental power is tied, and against which 
other reasonings are articulated. If God is dead then so, too, are univocal claims of a 
specific rationality as the unique truth. This is to propose a rather different and 
altogether more open argument than one restricted to contrasting the ambiguities of 
Western secularism with a series of alternatives secured in religious identification. 
The latter perspective, subtly criticized by Sadia Abbas in At Freedom’s Limit. Islam 
and the Postcolonial Predicament, certainly invests the noted arguments of Talal 
Asad, Saba Mahmood and Gil Anidjar when they contest secularism as being 
inherently imperial and implicit in the capitalist order of the world and the abstract 
coercions of consensual liberalism.6 
Secularism, as a self-conscious break with tradition, clearly does not commence 
from zero. Rather it assembles elements from the culture at hand to piece together a 
critical disposition seeking to comprehend and appropriate the world. In other words, 
it is a labour of translation seeking a methodology. It is the latter process that brings 
us into the vicinity of understanding the workings of secular critique in a manner 
diverse from a proclaimed critical distance and a modality of thinking seemingly 
untouched by altogether more messy transformations, breaks and connections. In 
                                                
5 Scott, “More on Laïcité in Historical Context”. 
6 Abbas, At Freedom’s Limit. Islam and the Postcolonial Predicament. 
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other words, if I continue to support the idea of the secular I also need to register its 
limits and location. If the drive for secular thinking moves within a planetary 
condition where universality cannot be unilaterally guaranteed, I have also to learn to 
temper the temptation of a desired universalism with the recognition that this is not 
the real state of affairs in contemporary history and culture, both at home and abroad. 
This opens up an important distinction between identifying Christianity as a cultural 
formation with Occidental modernity and the altogether more restricted intellectual 
power of secularism as a critical practice. While the former association can certainly 
be considered hegemonic, this is certainly not the case for the latter. 
So, if the argument that Occidental secularism is simply the off-spring of 
Christianity does not hold, neither, I would argue, is the suggestion that secularism 
can be separated from a history in which religion was, and is, central. Each is 
imbricated in the global formation we might call modernity. The appearance, or re-
appearance, of the terms of religion and secularism today are symptoms that draw 
upon the deep tensions and unconscious relations that manufacture the present. The 
dream of rationality, and of a thoroughly secularized understanding of the world 
discovers its inevitable limits in the rougher composition of cultural and historical 
complexities in which it has to make its way. Similarly, the ‘thick’ description of the 
practices of piety performed by a group of contemporary Muslim women in Cairo can 
be acknowledged as a form of agency while we at the same time register the limits of 
an anthropological claim on a world that does not merely move according to that local 
narrative of truth.7 All of this means that it becomes impossible to sustain that religion 
simply stands in for the ‘rest’ against the West as a counter-hegemonic set of 
oppositional practices. Simultaneously, the historical and cultural provenance and 
limits of secular criticism comes to be acknowledged (both in the Occident and 
elsewhere), precisely in order to hone its capabilities in a world that is far from 
willing to accept its promise of perpetual transit and critical transformation. Few 
desire to live in a tradition and identity that has constantly to be negotiated and 
renegotiated in the unfinished and inconclusive processes of the world becoming 
world. 
The ‘natural sacredness’ of reality which sustains the poetical piety pursued in Pier 
Paolo Pasolini’s film, The Gospel according to Saint Matthew (1964), as in all of his 
                                                
7 Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. 
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cinema, promotes a humble mission to endow the world with social justice: an act of 
faith that is simultaneously a critique of religious authority and the institutional 
powers of the Catholic Church for their betrayal of the teachings of Christ.8 A similar 
perspective was promoted in those very same years by the Italian anthropologist 
Ernesto De Martino in his ethnographic work among the peasantry of Southern Italy.9 
There is a subversive idea here. Language, as it were, is turned against itself to reveal 
a further possibility. If religion exercised the symbolic power essential for the 
production and reproduction of hegemony and insuring the status quo, it also provided 
the immediate syntax, creolized by local custom and tradition, for a popularly 
practiced, often heterodox, sense and its particular understandings of the sacred. 
Such an unsystematic, fragmented language can potentially provoke that critical 
self-awareness which Antonio Gramsci nominated ‘good sense’. From rural 
Catholicism in Southern Italy to Rastafarianism in the Caribbean and Islam in the 
Algerian qasba, such mixtures of conservatism and local knowledge are also sites of 
power. In a similar fashion, in a significant essay titled ‘Said, Religion, and Secular 
Criticism’, Gauri Viswanathan examines Edward Said’s attempt to elaborate a secular 
criticism while attentive to the heterogeneous complexities of Islam as a reasoning, 
dissenting tradition, opposed to the stereotypical understanding of a homogeneous 
consensus. What emerges at this point is perhaps less the chronological argument that 
modern secularism succeeds religion, but rather that dissenting traditions are already 
deeply embedded and disseminated within the heterodox historical making of religion 
itself. This, as Viswanathan notes, raises questions about secularism’s presumed 
autonomy ‘as a postreligious development’.10 
 
Friends, foes and faith 
The daily deployment of the lexical index of us and them, notoriously elaborated in 
the Schmittian distinction between friend and foe, has more recently been 
concentrated in the violent insistence of Samuel Huntingdon’s The Clash of 
                                                
8 Here is Gilles Deleuze describing Pasolini’s cinema: ‘[W]hat characterises Pasolini’s cinema is a 
poetic consciousness, which is not strictly aestheticist or technicist, but rather mystical or ‘sacred.’ This 
allows Pasolini to bring the perception-image, or the neurosis of his characters, on to a level of 
vulgarity and bestiality in the lowest subject-matter, while reflecting them in a pure, poetic 
consciousness, animated by the mythical or sacralising element’.  Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1. The 
Movement-Image, 77. 
9 De Martino, La terra del rimorso. Contributi a una storia religiosa del Sud. 
10 Viswanathan, “Said, Religion, and Secular Criticism”,171. 
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Civilizations. Accompanied by rising xenophobia and the unfolding lexicon of anti-
immigration legislation, we today increasingly register the brutality of the political, 
juridical and cultural schemata that seeks to reduce the world into neat, easily 
identifiable sides and oppositions. The problem, as we have already noted, is that 
there does not exist a unique and homogeneous West or East; just as there is no such 
thing as Islam, or Christianity. Many decades ago the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 
in his Islam Observed, underlined, in their respective crossing by local currents and 
conditions, the complex communality in difference of Islam in then contemporary 
Morocco and Indonesia. In the westernization of the world, the tendency, on the 
contrary, is towards a generalized standardization of the imaginary determined by the 
economy of the image. At this point, the power of the media provides the immediate 
measure of truth. 
The media seems to surrender to every temptation of reducing reality and 
condensing it into a symbol, thrusting the whole issue into discursive disrepair . 
. . In cinematographic language this fixed spatial determination is simply called 
‘a shot’, suggesting that the real is no longer represented but targeted. In the 
staccato of television news shots, this particular shot becomes the symbol that 
encapsulates the meaning of the entire drama. It is evident that complex social 
relations are not negotiated in this frantic manner.11  
To insist on Islam as a thing, invariably condensed in the figure of armed terrorists 
and veiled women – that is, an image to be confronted, contested and eventually 
converted to our way of life – is precisely, as both Edward Said and Gil Anidjar have 
argued, to reveal the centrality of religious discourse to the West. As a category for a 
distinct sense of understanding – like ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ –  ‘religion’ is very much 
an invention of Occidental modernity and its planetary pedagogy.12 Rey Chow has 
frequently pointed out that the separation of the world into distinct histories and 
cultures, via area, religious and geo-political studies, is a form of intellectual and 
historical management that holds on to the promise of disciplinary certitude.13 It leads 
to an enormous exercise, along the lines of divide and rule, in cultural and political 
power. This is to avoid the crushing verdict delivered more than seventy years ago 
from a Fascist prison by Antonio Gramsci: 
                                                
11 Biemann, “Agadez Chronicle. Post-colonial Politics of Space and Mobility in the Sahara.”, 45. 
12 Anidjar, Semites. Race, Religion, Literature, 27. 
13 Chow, The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work. 
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The question of religion is to be intended not in terms of a confessional faith but 
rather in the secular terms of the unity of belief between a vision of the world 
and rules of conduct; but why call this unity of belief ‘religion’ rather than 
‘ideology’, or more simply ‘politics’?14  
With this we arrive at the disquieting conclusion that Christianity is in fact the name, 
acknowledged or not, of Occidental modernity and… colonialism. As Fanon put it in 
The Wretched of the Earth:  
The Church in the colonies is a white man’s Church, a foreigners’ Church. It 
does not call the colonized to the ways of God, but to the ways of the white 
man, to the ways of the master, the ways of the oppressor. And as we know, in 
this story many are called but few are chosen.15 
Many, of course would contest this view and point to the appropriation of Christianity 
by black Africans and African Americans as a counter-site of cultural contestation 
and survival in colonial settler societies. Elsewhere, however, it helps us to appreciate 
better the resistance, refusal and resentment induced by Christianity, together with its 
secular counter-image, when its Occidental cultural composition and historical 
planetary power is viewed and lived precisely as a colonial imposition. Western 
secularism, too, is sustained by a disposition of belief: in the teleological redemption 
of time as ‘progress’, in the calling to redeem the planet in a unique image and impose 
a European derived humanism on the cosmos. As Gramsci sharply reminds us, the 
relationship between religion, the state and political formations in the West is 
indissoluble, and invariably renders critical secularism subordinate. ‘The principal 
elements of common sense are provided by religion and therefore the relationship 
between common sense and religion is much more intimate than that between 
common sense and the philosophical systems of the intellectuals.’16 
In the immediacy of inherited beliefs, popular sayings, superstitions, everyday 
practices and local custom, that is, in common-sensical understandings deposited in 
the textures of everyday life, the subaltern both recognizes herself while finding there 
the ambivalent resources of her language. For that language can both confirm and 
modify, both sustain and subvert, the status quo. Historical forces, social crises and 
                                                
14 Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere,1378. 
15 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 7. 
16 Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, 1396–97. 
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individual assessment can interrupt the continuum of common sense, exposing its 
constructed and contradictory nature. So, we need to ask ourselves, where do these 
popular beliefs come from? How do they acquire coherence? As we have seen, 
Gramsci attributes to religion the principal sources of common sense. Those whose 
conceptions of the world are largely inscribed in the parameters of an everyday 
consensus, for whom a critical education is socially and economically excluded, 
inevitably tended to reproduce meanings that sustained a narrative endorsed by 
theological finality. Here the Catholic Church reveals its mastery of the syncretic: 
combining religious dogma and peasant, stretching back to pagan, community rites in 
a potent synthesis in the multiple souths of the planet. It is precisely on these grounds, 
as Gramsci argued, that intellectual dissent and critical philosophies are invariably 
resisted. The potential disruption of the everyday world is considered the work of an 
external and negative language that seeks to limit the freedom of popular thought and 
belief, and render it subordinate and marginal. This, of course, is a profoundly 
political problem. How is the slippery coherence of common sense, secured in 
sedimented understandings of the religiosity of the universe, to be transformed? This 
delivers us into a deeper quandary. Simply to consider the weight of the religious 
underwriting of contemporary politics, in particular in modern Occidental society, is 
to register the disturbing heart of the question. 
For the secular West is clearly also sustained by the ‘unseen order’ (William 
James) of religious belief. 17  In historical terms this argument would rarely be 
contested; just think of the centrality of Christianity in its Protestant variants to the 
making of British colonialism and modernity, so meticulously traced by historians 
Catherine Hall and Carolyn Steedman.18 Yet, to insist on the contemporary impact of 
this formation is usually to encounter an uncomfortable silence. Surely in our 
modernity, religion is now elsewhere, back there and elsewhere: the property and 
problem of someone else? As Leila Ahmed pointed out, in their centuries-long 
struggle for greater freedom and rights, no one ever suggested that Occidental women 
should abandon Christianity, yet it is precisely this option – the abandonment of Islam 
in order to embrace modernity – that the West today requires of Muslim women.19 
                                                
17 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 53. 
18 Hall,  Civilizing Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830–1867; Carolyn 
Steedman, Master and Slave: Love and Labour in the English Industrial Age. 
19 Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, 244. 
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This, of course, is also to assume that Islam and modernity are separate entities, and 
not profoundly entwined and multiplied in both European and planetary formations. 
That one can be a modern Muslim woman clearly undoes any singular definition of 
modernity, its politics, practices and possibilities.  
Religion lived as an unseen Occidental order today increasingly reveals itself; for 
example, in the moment that Turkish membership of the European Union is 
considered. In the end, the objections to Turkey come down to religion and the fear of 
Islam: kebab counters are acceptable, but the idea of pinnacled mosques punctuating 
the skyline of European cities is another matter. The fact is that a superficial 
secularism, spawned by the Occidental category of religion, can becomes a 
proposition whereby inequalities and hierarchies of racial, ethnic and gender 
discrimination are sustained on a global scale. For it is a ‘discourse of power that 
legitimates itself and presents itself as secular as if indifferent to religion yet 
producing religion as a (generic) problem’.20 This brings us to confront the racializing 
pedagogy of reason and religion: between those who know and those cast out in 
ignorance, excluded and rendered inferior in their religious bigotry and 
fundamentalism. 21  And then religion, as a bulwark against the atheism of 
communism, has formally been an integral part of the post-1945 political landscape in 
Europe, clearly registered in the near hegemony of the Christian Democrat parties in 
Germany and Italy for decades. To consider politicized Islam, for example, in a 
modern Turkey that has historically been gripped in the military enforcement of 
secularism, is seemingly to consider an alien reality rather than part of a clearly 
differentiated but shared modernity. Finally, prizing open the intricate 
interrelationship between Occidental secular society and religion also opens up 
another path towards unpacking the unexamined faith that democracy and capitalism 
somehow coexist in harmony, sustained by the laws of the market and the theology of 
individual freedom. What if, behind the mask of Christian morality, they are on the 
contrary actually deeply antagonistic? 
 
Blinded by icons 
Of course, one might initially object that many of these observations, in this case 
                                                
20 Anidjar, Semites, Race, Religion, Literature, 51. 
21 Ibid., 17. 
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largely inspired by Antonio Gramsci’s observations in the Italy of the 1930s, have 
been overtaken by events. In the West, the simple, rural peasantry and unruly working 
class no longer exist as distinct cultural blocs in any obvious position of cultural 
subalternity. Today, the ignorant, rural pastor who repeats platitudes to his illiterate 
flock is sometimes replaced by the independent, urban priest who provides a focus in 
the struggle against crime and corruption, occasionally paying for their sermons with 
their lives. As organic figures of the local community, these priests provide a cultural, 
political and moral direction in the absence of political leadership from the state and 
official cultural agencies. If secular, intellectual culture continues to remain ‘external’ 
to the sense of street life and its moral economy, and the rhetoric of the ecclesiastic 
regime remains largely unaltered, conditions have nevertheless changed. The worldly 
languages of the mass media and metropolitan culture have truncated the ancient 
alliances of popular superstition, clerical obscurantism, and the public authority of the 
Church. At the same time, however, the legislative power registered in the ubiquitous 
lexicons of Christianity and the television screen actually betray far deeper currents. 
They illustrate how the Church has adapted in a molecular manner to the media of 
contemporary culture, and demonstrate how Occidental culture is itself thoroughly 
Christianized. The news shot, the image and the icon, just like the television screen 
and the figure of the Madonna, are deeply embedded in each other’s agendas. 
If to see is to believe, and the image is considered to be ‘factual’ testimony to the 
event, then the Occidental vision sustained in Christian iconography – the whole 
history of Western art from the late classical period through to the Baroque and 
beyond – has hardly been displaced or disrupted by so-called secular modernity. On 
the contrary, faith in the immediate visualization of truth – from the expression of the 
Virgin Mary to the subsequent plunge through TV reality shows and the digital 
framing of the aerial bombardment of the not-yet-modern world – is firmly 
unshaken.22 Edward Said suggestively noted that this ubiquitous realism reaffirms 
Europe’s historical trajectory; a realism that is sustained in a precise conceptual unity: 
[T]he Church and the Holy Roman Empire guarantee the integrity of the core 
European literatures. At a still deeper level, it is from the Christian Incarnation 
that Western realistic literature as we know it emerges. This tenaciously 
advanced thesis explained Dante’s supreme importance to Auerbach, Curtius, 
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Vossler, and Spitzer.23 
Today, while the aura of the unique artwork fades into the multiplying flux of the 
copy, the aura of a seemingly tangible and immediate reality, even if mediated and 
manipulated (after all, it is an image, an inscription, a cultural construction, a pixel 
configuration), remains undisturbed. ‘Nature’, the ‘human’ and ‘faith’ are 
immediately present and simultaneously removed from critical concern: they simply 
are. As Gramsci once suggested, only a polemical relationship to such an inheritance 
and hegemony is possible. Only a critical undoing and overcoming of common sense 
can lead to a ‘new philosophy: this explains the necessity of a polemic with traditional 
philosophies in the exposition of the philosophy of praxis.’24  
What clearly emerges from this discussion is the primacy that Gramsci gives to the 
generative role of culture in the critical understanding of the political powers of a 
historical formation. Power is exercised; that is, it is not merely applied as a direct 
force, but is practiced, performed, and extended in the immediacy of everyday 
perceptions and languages. Power does not simply subject. It seeks to convince and 
hence, as Judith Butler has argued, is both a subjecting and subjective force. The 
centrality and originality of Gramsci’s thought lies precisely here in the key idea that 
cultural hegemony has to be achieved prior to the realization of political power. This 
evokes a pedagogical undertaking that seeks in education (understood in the widest 
sense of the term) the means able to challenge the status quo, leading to knowledge 
that is not an object to be attained and possessed as information, but rather a 
disposition that sustains a critical appropriation in constant engagement. It is not by 
chance that the increasing configuration of education in terms of market criteria, 
privatization and religious belonging, signal, in the most blatant manner, this ongoing 
struggle for hegemony within the heartlands of Occidental schooling. 
Perhaps the central, if largely unnamed, force of cultural consensus and 
conservation in the West is that represented by religion; that is, by Christianity. The 
continuing silence of intellectuals in the face of the religious elaboration of 
Occidental hegemony, both at home (education, public morality, family values) and 
abroad (colonialism, imperialism, globalization, liberalism and their combination in 
civilizing missions and ‘humanitarian’ military interventions) suggests Christianity’s 
                                                
23 Said, Culture and Imperialism, 45. 
24 Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, 1397. 
 14 
implicit organicity to that formation. This very silence betrays a structural complicity. 
Religion, like the school and the family, are among those apparatuses that Louis 
Althusser incisively referred to as ideological state apparatuses. ISAs interpellate our 
individual and collective formation to the degree that we (mis)recognize ourselves 
within them.25 Christian values are taken for granted, rendered common-sensical, by 
both by those in power and by those subordinate and potentially in opposition.  
Perhaps such values require an altogether more Nietzschean and Foucauldian style 
of critical revaluation: the Church and its violent custody of ontological truth and 
belief, has played a formidable role in the formation of modern society and its global 
reach and imposition; certainly as significant as that played by the prison, the clinic, 
and the invention of sexuality, not to speak of its centrality to the practices and 
institutions of colonialism and imperialism, Perhaps, secularism is another one of 
those inventions? This suggests that something more is required than an intellectual 
critique of Occidental religiosity – whether by classically influenced and pagan-tinged 
Renaissance humanists, or skeptical Enlightenment thinkers. It suggests the need for 
an altogether more radical exposition of the archive or genealogy of religion in the 
West. In the end, it comes down to a sharp revaluation of the Occidental archive; that 
is, the critical exposure, undoing and reworking of the powers of a precise historical 
and cultural formation. Here, and recalling the discussion of Pasolini's cinema, is 
Antonio Gramsci once again: 
It seems to me that the problem is much simpler than it is made to appear by 
those who implicitly consider ‘Christianity’ as being inherent to modern 
civilization, or lack the courage to raise the question of the relations between 
Christianity and modern civilization.. . . the people of the Orient perceive the 
hostility which is invisible in our countries because Christianity has adapted 
itself molecularly and has become Jesuitism, that is, a great social hypocrisy.26 
 
The colonization of democracy 
Today we are caught in the asymmetrical relationship between the internal 
principles of liberal citizenship and a militant differentiation and exclusion. This 
can be considered as the postcolonial fall-out of the logic of spatial domination 
                                                
25 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)”. 
26 Gramsci, op. cit. 333. 
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that has historically accompanied the construction of liberalism as the 
hegemonic modus operandi of colonialism and Western modernity.   
        Sandro Mezzadra  
 
While there is much talk these days of the relationship between democracy and Islam, 
or of the question of  Muslim women and secular freedom, we are completely 
unaccustomed to posing those questions to Christianity. No one would presume to 
talk of women in metropolitan Europe as Christian women, or ask of Christianity to 
account for itself in terms of democracy and gender equality, although in both 
historical and contemporary terms this is clearly a pertinent question.27 It is simply as 
though Christianity, democracy and modernity are all one. If religion, as Durkheim 
argued, is a symbolic system in which society becomes collectively conscious of 
itself, then so-called secular Europe and North America is historically and culturally 
soaked in Christian values and beliefs. It reveals, as Talad Asad insists, that religion is 
a complex cultural system in which power is decisive for its affirmation.28 
At this point, it might be significant to accept the idea that Europe is fundamentally 
Christian in its formation. After all, that is how Europe itself institutionally presents 
itself. From this critical starting point it becomes possible to think the limits of Europe 
and its religious infrastructure in a critical space that neither has authorized. To seek 
to change the languages of comprehension is to disrupt an existing consensus and 
accompanying order. In an altogether more fluid scenario, a historical bloc cannot 
appeal to an autonomy unsullied by the forces and currents that precede and exceed 
its attempts to grasp and transform the world, but neither can it simply be construed as 
an abstract counter-power located in the anonymous multitude that sustains First 
World desires for radical change. To seek in the external what is most profoundly 
internal – the imperious faith in material and metaphysical progress that sustains, 
however critically, the liberal and Occidental appropriation of the planet and its 
economic, political, cultural and religious syntax – is to avoid the big chill that 
accompanies the discomfort of a profound critical interruption. Displacing the logic of 
its language, disseminating an interrogative cut in what Derrida called 
‘globalatinization’, and thereby insisting that not all roads lead to Rome, promotes the 
                                                
27 Lazreg, The Eloquence of Silence: Algerian Women in Question, 7. 
28 Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianism and Islam. 
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undoing and dispersal of such white mythologies.29 As I understand it, this would be a 
truly secular criticism.  
As we are well aware, liberal democracy is full of promises of freedom and 
equality that it is incapable of delivering; for it seeks, as Étienne Balibar points out, 
not equality but equivalence in the liberal world market. This ultimately explains why 
the liberal consensus makes so few demands in terms of democratic participation. 
Politics is increasingly mediated through the channels (and concentrated powers) of 
mass communications that call upon citizen-spectators to verify the truth of the image 
and then mandate a government that expects them to remain faithful. The very nature 
of this state of affairs, in which the interests of the First World are deeply intertwined 
with the direction of the global economy, is far from consonant with the ‘egalitarian 
and participatory aspirations of democracy’.30 
Liberalism as the motor of such a development is hardly in the position to 
transcend this problem except in a vacuous rhetoric where terms like freedom stand in 
for the defense of the status quo and the existing distribution of riches, resources, and 
power. Crisis and contingency are continually disciplined by this premise, and 
democracy is increasingly denuded of all critical import, reduced to the disembodied 
language of tolerance and pluralism. The question on whose terms participation is 
permitted brings us back to Gramsci’s considerations on the margins of history and 
the exclusion of subaltern and popular forces from its definition. In modern Europe 
the vicious state repression of sporadic and spontaneous peasant revolts seeking rural 
reform, invariably nurtured with a sense of justice drawn from popular religious 
sentiments, betrays precisely the power relations secreted in a institutional secularism 
forcibly insisting on the separation of religion and the state.  
Gramsci himself draws on the case of Davide Lazzaretti, leader of a peasant revolt 
in the Monte Amiata region of southern Tuscany, and the priests and peasants 
involved around the same period in the mountains of Benevento and Matese, north of 
Naples. This potent, popular mixture represented a challenge to both lay and religious 
authority. Under a left-wing national government, the revolt was squashed and 
Lazzaretti summarily executed by a firing squad in 1878. A radical religiosity crossed 
with republican sentiments – on the red flag of Lazzaretti’s movement was written 
                                                
29 Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason; Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. 
30 Balibar, “Debating with Alain Badiou on Universalism” 
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‘The Republic and the kingdom of God’ – dramatically exposed institutional power to 
the limits of its hypocritical rhetoric: just whose rights and religion were being 
defended here?31 An existing order is privileged over the potential instability of of 
participation in the practices of egalitarianism. Meaningful involvement in political 
power is blocked precisely in the instance that power itself grows in increasingly 
undemocratic and unaccountable concentration. As the cultural, historical and 
political product of Occidental modernity, liberalism is simultaneously Christian and 
yet in conflict with the full reaches of democracy when it comes to be voiced in the 
languages of a republicanism and radical religious sentiments seeking a justice yet to 
come. 
When structural and institutional questions of power are reduced to debates over 
policy decisions and moralistic intent, then questions of justice and freedom — for 
whom, where, when and how? — are diverted into appeals to an abstract humanity by 
which the whole world is colonized and its heterogeneous challenges sequestered and 
subsequently silenced. This logic can take many forms and degrees of sophistication, 
but in the end it is reduced to the bluntness of ‘You’re either with us — the West and 
its ‘democracy’, ‘progress’, ‘civilization’ (and implicitly its Christianity) — or against 
us’. Just as in the hierarchical order of racialized colors where whiteness goes 
unannounced, so in the sphere of religion the hegemonic formation does not need to 
be nominated. Non-Christians can only be considered trespassers in (Occidental) 
modernity, for they are structurally excluded. We are all expected to respect the 
economical, juridical, and cultural laws of such a perspective, and those of us in 
difficulty are expected to work harder in order to enter the frame, certainly not to 
question, disrupt, or re-articulate its premises. In this sense, liberalism with its 
religious formation and premises has fully colonized democracy, reducing it to a 
smiling mask and public masque, and its language to an infinite and ineffectual 
ventriloquism. 
 
The violence of secularism 
The liberal violence to which I refer (as opposed to the violence of illiberal 
regimes) is translucent. It is the violence of universalizing reason itself.  
                                                
31 Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, 2279–83. 
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         Talal Asad 
 
Tied deeply into the largely unrecognized nexus between religion, secularism and 
liberal political power is the question of tradition. This is not to suggest the seemingly 
obvious idea of tradition as the source of religious rites, customs and beliefs that 
survive and live on in the complex currents of modernity, but rather to insist that in 
the narratives of continuity, in the faith in the uniqueness of Occidental progress, in 
the narration of the nation as the privileged locus of identity practices and history, a 
metaphysics of belief, formed and disciplined by Christianity, remains unchallenged. 
Here, of course, we are conversing with Friedrich Nietzsche and his acerbic critique 
of the ‘slave mentality’ of modernity, but we are also joined by Gramsci and his 
insistence on the political function of Christianity in the manufacture of the fragments 
that are held together in the glue of common sense and a world outlook whose secular 
affirmation is inextricably bound to centuries of religious incubation. As an uncanny 
insistence, taken, transformed and translated into a secular vision, the continuing 
dissemination of a transcendental authority – from baptism to the cemetery – is 
undeniably still firmly in place. As an integrating force, as a form of social cement 
and cultural cohesion, the atemporal values of Christianity seemingly legitimate a 
tradition (transformed, rendered modern) that is ours.  
In a Durkheimian sense, this may well be its social function. However, we also 
need to insist on the more uncomfortable perspective that as a disseminated form of 
power, as the molecularization of a spiritual order, Christianity continues to provide 
and legitimate the order of the West. To argue that people still draw on Christianity in 
order to domesticate and make sense of the world may well be true, but it may also be 
the case that such a need blocks other horizons of sense, obscures other, less 
provincial and more beneficial, structures of belief. In this sense, Christianity 
becomes the touchstone of the West: rendered most explicit in the public political 
rhetoric of the United States. If, these days, public leaders increasingly argue that 
Christianity should be formally acknowledged in the founding discourse and the 
identity touchstone of Europe and the Occident (thereby excising the creolizing 
prospects of the pagan Greeks and Romans, along with the European claims of 
Judaism and Islam), then Western modernity loses its exceptional secular state. It 
becomes coeval, crossed, divided and contested by the very same forces – religion – 
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that it seeks to expel into the backward and underdeveloped margins of its empire. To 
prise open this Occidental archive, and to dirty its shelves with these heretical and 
unauthorized matters – paganism, Judaism and Islam – is to propose an altogether 
more unruly study of the making of modern secularism. 
Secularization, as the seemingly progressive disinvestment in the institutions and 
rites of religious certainties, turns out to be a homeopathic force. It does not cancel 
Christianity: the theology of individual redemption and teleological progress rather 
doubles and disseminates the belief system of modernity’s historical winners. 
Monuments to wars fought, territories conquered and the world converted to its 
beliefs – European cities are brimming with these signs and symbols – propose a 
moral economy that considers itself the judge of mankind. God may well have 
abandoned his long hair and flowing robes, but he has certainly not withdrawn his 
support from the transcendental powers of the West.  
The assumption is that whereas: 
the West has surpassed the religious stage of Christianity, the world of Islam – 
its varied societies, histories, and languages notwithstanding—is still mired in 
religion, primitivity and backwardness. Therefore, the West is modern, greater 
than the sum of its parts, full of enriching contradictions and yet always 
‘Western’ in its cultural identity; the world of Islam, on the other hand, is no 
more than ‘Islam’, reducible to a small number of unchanging characteristics.32   
Thinking the relationship between the presumptions of an internal secularism 
(Europe, the West and its modernity) and an externalized religious world (Islam, 
Hinduism, the south of the planet and its underdevelopment), an altogether more 
complex picture emerges. Conjoined with the state, an apparent secularism becomes 
the name of a governance and the management of faith, belief and religion through 
modern technologies of power, and certainly not, as we are usually taught, the 
realization of a post-religious society. In the end, we could be pushed to suggest that 
this public manner of secularism (as opposed to a critical secularism) promotes 
religion as a category essential to its reproduction as a necessary partner in its 
ongoing formation. 
Exploring what Talal Asad refers to as the epistemological assumptions of the 
                                                
32 Said, Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest 
of the World, 10-11. 
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secular, and its imbrications in the practices and technologies of modern power, we 
can register that secularism is not really about personal choice, or the identification of 
an individual or collective state isolated from religion.33 It is rather a discursive 
formation that is among the necessary conditions of a historical and cultural matrix, 
addressing the mediation and management of beliefs and convictions in the formation 
and direction of modern power and politics. Stripping away public  announcements of 
the secular does not so much reveal the religious infrastructure of our faith in 
modernity as expose the historical constellation that is simultaneously sustained and 
sutured by religion, secularism and the institutional and everyday powers they 
exercise in shaping the horizons of sense. At this point, both public and private 
spheres as historical sites of the dispositions of power are already and simultaneously 
‘christianized’ and secularized.  
 
Learning from Islam 
What has occurred? To refer to the intertwining of liberalism and religion in 
eighteenth and nineteenth Europe is, as we noted, quite acceptable in historical and 
cultural terms. It is understood in both sociological and philosophical perspectives to 
be central to the making of Occidental modernity. Yet when we turn to the present it 
is as though the argument no longer holds. Of course, political and cultural 
configurations shift and change, they are contingent; however, there has been no 
epistemological rupture, no radical revaluation of values. We are perhaps right to 
suspect that this previous order, even if displaced and unacknowledged, continues to 
discipline the core of the European public and private sphere, its technologies of 
power, and its bio-politics. Talk of Turkey’s entrance into the European Union in 
Germany, or of headscarves in France, and that inherited corpus of thought and 
practices immediately springs into life to sound the chord of the ‘lasting trauma’ of 
Islam for Christianity.34 In an apparently secularized modernity we continue to 
grapple with the ghosts of a formation that refuses to pass away. At this point, the 
apparently sharp separation, and subsequent opposition, between secularism and 
religion falls, dissolved into an altogether more ambivalent fluidity. Public 
declarations of secularism become problematic. As a social and cultural practice it, 
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34 Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient, 59. 
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too, is caught, suspended and sustained in a constellation – Occidental modernity – in 
which Christianity and its variants was, and is, essential to its hegemony. 
This is clearly, both in historical and philosophical terms, a complicated argument 
that requires a careful unwinding in order to identify its multiple modalities and 
affects. In these pages I have tried to separate out a public, institutional and 
superficial discourse on secularism from an altogether more incisive and largely 
ignored critical secularism, willing to historically and culturally examine its own 
premises and perspectives, willing to learn from its limits. What – and thinking of 
Gramsci’s many meditations on the question of religion, popular culture, the 
institutional powers of Catholicism, and the realization of hegemony – becomes clear 
is that liberalism, secularism, and religion are not distinct categories to be contrasted, 
but rather provide the critical triangulation of a specific historical formation and its 
subsequent political and cultural configurations. Perhaps, and referring to the 
provocative title of this section, it might be instructive to look elsewhere for a 
moment. This is not in order to find a better realization of the role of religion in social 
and political life, but rather, in considering other forms and formulations, to help us 
register the limits of a specific configuration, peculiar to the West, that considers its 
perspectives universal and its solutions inevitably the most civilized and morally 
superior. Christianity, at this point, becomes the moral adjudicator of modern 
(Occidental) civilization.  
Gramsci succinctly acknowledged such presumptions in his short comparative 
analysis in the Quaderni del Carcere of Islam and Christianity and their relationship 
to modernity. In both, he notes that it is not religion per se that is unable to 
molecularly adapt itself to modernity, but social and historical structures – such as 
feudalism and cultural isolation – that create obstacles to that process. Gramsci goes 
even further. He suggests that the absence of the massive religious hierarchy and 
institutional powers of the Church makes Islam potentially even more susceptible to 
eventual transformation and modernization. He concludes: ‘Christianity has taken 
nine centuries to evolve and adapt, and it has done so in small steps, etc.; Islam is 
forced into a headlong rush’.35  
In an important, pathbreaking, essay that further opens up such a critically 
intercultural space within modernity, Armando Salvatore and Mark LeVine have 
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examined the question of the public sphere and technologies of power in modern 
Muslim majority countries.36 They consider the centrality of the Islamic concept and 
legal method of Istislah for seeking social good through mediation, compromise and 
consensus as being central to a Muslim understanding of the public sphere. They 
contrast this practice with the abstract, universal categories of law and justice that 
sustain the conceptual violence and frequently punishing modalities of reason in the 
West. Their argument is that the public sphere, in its singular Occidental abstractness, 
excludes other kinds of reason, and cancels the understanding of its own particular 
historical formation. They then extend their analysis through a Gramscian reading, 
attentive to the historical textures and cultural sentiments and formation of Islamic 
notions of custom, ‘urf, and habits or ‘adat, where ideas such as the public sphere and 
justice are certainly not absent, but neither are they simply poor copies of their 
Occidental counterparts. The very sense of the ‘public’, for historical and cultural 
reasons, is figured differently. It is neither transparent nor readily translatable into 
Western reasoning. As such it marks not simply a difference but also proposes a 
critical challenge. 
What emerges most clearly from Salvatore’s and LeVine’s analysis is the 
Occidental lynchpin of the private citizen who, after all, ‘is just one – albeit 
historically powerful and largely hegemonic – practiced and theorized approach to the 
public sphere’.37 The manner in which the public sphere is embedded in the dynamics 
of the modern Muslim world, exposes ‘secularly oriented rationality’ as being not the 
only normative language for public life.38 This means to face the hubris – both 
historical and conceptual – that the distinction between public politics and private 
religion is ‘foreign to the nature and history of Islam’ (Sayyid Qutb) . This leads 
inevitably, as Ronald A. T. Judy points out, to a ‘historical criticism of European 
secularism’. 39  Such considerations render altogether more problematic the 
Habermasian conception of the ‘public sphere’, with its rigid dependency upon the 
liberal category of the ‘private citizen’. All of this stretches and reformulates the 
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Gramscian understanding of civil society to include multiple social and cultural 
articulations on which ‘alternative hegemonic configurations of publicness in the 
Muslim majority world and elsewhere base their forces and sometimes legitimacy’.40  
In this altogether more complex conceptual mix, everyday practices and spaces 
receive and rework religion and tradition as forms of ongoing negotiation, mediation, 
refusal and resistance to an order that may be simultaneously local, national and 
international. This is close to Gramsci’s understanding of the hold of counter-
hegemonic prospects of popular religion and its implicit desire for social justice 
among the peasants of southern Italy. 
Remaining on the edge of this critical fault-line, where European categories do not 
readily transmute into other historical heritages, and recognizing that religion itself 
continues to haunt the very heart of the West, we are confronted with the task, already 
elaborated in different ways by Talal Asad and Gil Anidjar, of locating and 
provincializing secular modernity. In particular, as Salvatore and LeVine rightly 
insist, the myth of liberal politics secured in the figure of free, autonomous subjects 
and their associated decisional power, is rendered altogether more problematic. The 
complexity of forces that render accessibility to public recognition difficult, unequal 
and frequently unjust, transforms the abstract concept of the individual into an 
altogether less reassuring figure, certainly de-centered and de-potentialized with 
respect to the autonomous powers assumed and assured by the modern myth of 
citizenship. If in Occidental liberalism the state is premised on the apparently sharp 
distinction and subsequent contracts between the public and the private spheres, 
Salvatore and LeVine argue that other forms of public participation emerge when 
public reason is based on: 
a practical reason sanctified by religious tradition, however variably interpreted. 
Such a perspective provides these discourses with a level of fluidity and 
adaptability that account in large measure for their success in mobilizing large 
numbers of people in their cause.41 
While the authors justly underline that this fluid ambivalence cannot be automatically 
labeled subaltern or counter-hegemonic, they argue that ideas of public welfare and 
social justice are entwined in a complex sociopolitical matrix. Here in an historical 
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formation in which change is in custody to local coordinates and conditions, tradition 
– the entwining of popular forms of cultural life and religious customs that Gramsci 
recognized – also provides and provokes sites of transformation. This is to think with 
Gramsci where the practice of reasoning occurs, inaugurating a potential passage 
from common to good sense: in the traditions of the popular religious lexicon of 
southern Italian Catholicism, in the multiple and differentiated localities of 
contemporary Muslim communities. This is not to praise Islam (or Catholicism), or to 
extract from modern Muslim society an improved prospect of the common good. 
Rather, in contrasting the ambiguities and embedded responses to the forces of 
modernity with the abstract rigidity of Occidental definitions, an intercultural critique 
is rendered possible: sense is not a category but, evoking a lineage that runs from Ibn 
Khaldûn through Giambattista Vico to Marx and Gramsci, is rather the product of 
historical and cultural practices. This suggests that modern ideas of social justice and 
public welfare have a complex history in diverse cultural formations. These cannot be 
reduced to an Occidental version whose abstraction pretends universal validity. 
Outside and beyond the liberal repertoire of tolerance, integration, and assimilation 
in which Occidental categories are secured as the norm, largely immune from 
criticism (that includes a radical secular criticism), it becomes altogether more 
pressing to elaborate the idea of an emergent public sphere that will challenge 
hegemonic power formations whose authority may be predominantly religious or 
purportedly secular. What was once considered to be the property and privilege of the 
West – the knowledges, practices and institutions that inform justice, well-being and 
freedom – will come, as Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak might put it, to be ‘worlded’ 
in a manner that confronts its ‘widespread social hypocrisy’, and pose a challenge to 
its particular authority. There exist other ways of being in the world, of being in 
modernity. 
Returning religion to an apparently secular Europe, the fundamental point here is 
that Islam is not simply in Europe, but also profoundly of Europe. Today, this is not 
only the case among its present-day immigrant populations from North Africa and 
Asia, but has been so for well over a thousand years (that is, for a longer period than 
Christianity has existed around much of the Baltic Sea): medieval Islamic Spain, 
Sicily and Malta, the Ottoman Empire, the medieval and modern Balkans. In other 
words, Islam refers to an internal component in the making of modern Europe and not 
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simply to the externalized other that mirrors European fears and self-fashioning.  
Muslims are clearly present in a secular Europe and yet in an important sense 
absent from it. The problem of understanding Islam in Europe is primarily, so I 
claim, a matter of understanding how ‘Europe’ is conceptualized by 
Europeans.42 
Historically, Islamic culture represented not simply the transmission belt of classical 
learning to medieval Europe, but was the site of a fundamental transformation and 
translation of that knowledge into modern concepts and concerns: from algebra to 
agronomy, from poetry to philosophy.  
Like today’s un-welcomed immigrant, the externalized and expelled body of Islam 
de-centers and dispels the unquestioned referent of an autochthonous Europe and its 
seemingly autonomous elaborations. The presumed homogeneity of a European 
space, temporality and identity is challenged by an altogether more complex, unstable 
geography, home to multiple rhythms, accents and compositions. Here, the assumed 
autonomy of the individual, the presumed secularism of the state, the triumph of 
reason and the progressive universalism of its culture is interceded and interrupted by 
ongoing practices and possibilities in which traditions, translations and other modes 
of reasoning exceed the liberal coordinates of Occidental hegemony. Modernity is 
transformed from an existing state into a potential that is folded into diverse makings 
of the world whose dynamic and unpredictable outcome, as Gramsci always warned 
us, is ultimately unknown. 
It is precisely in this expanded and unauthorized world that we are confronted with 
the paradoxical fulfillment of religion as a seemingly secular power. Or rather, this is 
to appreciate the cultural and historical impossibility of thinking that Christianity (or 
Islam) ‘can be unambiguously treated as a “religion”’.43 The point here, and returning 
to Gramsci’s insistence on the intricate interrelationship of Christianity and 
modernity, is that Occidental belief is not, as Max Weber might have put it, simply 
transferred into a boundless faith in rationalism and individual self-realization in the 
modern capitalist order. Individualized conduct and salvation are also ultimately 
essential components in the formation and practices of planetary bio-powers and 
politics. The nexus of religion and a seemingly secularized modernity does not simply 
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refer us to observable cultural rites and religious customs, and Europe and North 
America is saturated in these, but above all, and more precisely, to the ongoing 
practices that reveal the religious infrastructure of the West’s belief in itself and the 
missionary exercise of its powers on the rest of the world. 
Definitions of the world in hierarchies of cultural value continue to mirror the 
historically sanctified ethnic superiority of the West. Occidental humanism, as the 
assumed epistemological and moral origin of knowledge, continues to propose its 
mission of worldly redemption in a rationality that is simultaneously racist and 
religious. In the persistence of the discriminatory categories of race and religion that 
continue to distinguish and subordinate both the non-Occidental world and its internal 
populations, the familiarity of common sense composes explanations for the existing 
bio-political order.44 Paying attention to the intricate weave of cultural textures, to 
their historical formation and contemporary power, we perhaps need to excavate this 
archeology in order to judge better ourselves and others. If it is there that we seek to 
anchor our analysis in relation to criticial freedom, is also there that we uncover the 
unacknowledged faith and belief of much modern secularism; in other words, as 
Gramsci pointed out, the genealogy of its politics. In the seemingly secular reach of 
the Occidental empire, its knowledge formation and methodologies, in its presumed 
ethical and ethnical preeminence, we cannot avoid the ancient rhythms of a 
theological heartbeat.  
Sources of the chapter’s epigraphs: Chraibi, “Occidente  estremo”, 23;  Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere,   
; Anidjar Semites: Race, Religion, Literature,47. 
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